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The rapid advance of communication technologies in many ar-
eas of the human society accelerates the displacement of many
social processes on such systems, in particular on the Internet.
This brings numerous benefits to the users, but it also in-
creases their dependencies on these technologies. These de-
pendencies create a growing potential of threats, while the in-
creasing technological complexity of the systems makes them
more and more vulnerable.
Security has, therefore, become a crucial feature in the devel-
opment and acceptance of the Internet. The growing depend-
ency of human society on information technology (IT) systems
and in particular on the Internet has moved IT security in the fo-
cus of interest. Large efforts are made to preserve the confi-
dentiality and integrity of data, to ensure the authorization of ac-
cesses to resources, and to avoid misuse of the Internet. The
majority of the procedures applied and the approaches investi-
gated focus on preventive measures that try to avoid a harmful
behavior of the users. Less attention is paid to reactive meas-
ures which are triggered when intruders succeed to circumvent
all security barriers. The rapidly increasing number of attacks –
alone in 20031 about 137529 security incidents have been reg-
istered by the Coordination Center of the US Computer Emer-
gency Response Team (CERT/CC) – makes it more and more
apparent that IT security cannot be achieved by prevention
alone. Only reactive measures are capable to respond appro-
priately to hinder an attacker, to avoid harm, or to prevent future
intrusions. Therefore, future IT security measures should be
more complementary taking into account both aspects.
The enforcement of research activities in this area is the objec-
tive of the special interest group SIDAR (Security – Intrusion
Detection and Response) which was recently founded as part
of the Security and Safety division of the German Informatics
Society (GI). SIDAR focuses on reactive aspects of IT security
and related areas. The main topics of interest are Intrusion De-
tection and Prevention, Incident Response, and Computer Fo-
rensic. SIDAR addresses both academic research and indus-
trial development and deployment. It provides a forum for re-
searchers and users to review, discuss, and learn about new
approaches, concepts, and experiences in the field of reactive
1 CERT/CC annotates regarding these statistics: “Given the widespread
use of automated attack tools, attacks against Internet-connected sys-
tems have become so commonplace that counts of the number of inci-
dents reported provide little information with regard to assessing the
scope and impact of attacks. Therefore, as of 2004, we will no longer pub-
lish the number of incidents reported. Instead, we will be working with oth-
ers in the community to develop and report on more meaningful metrics,
…”.
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security measures. More information about SIDAR is available
on the website of the group: http://www.gi-fb-sicherheit.de/fg/
sidar/.
One of the first activities of SIDAR was the organization of the
DIMVA 2004 which was held July 6th-7th, 2004 in Dortmund.
DIMVA is an annual workshop in the German-speaking area
dedicated to Intrusion Detection, Malicious Agents, and Vulner-
ability Assessment. The next event will take place 2005 in Vi-
enna. DIMVA will increase the public awareness of reactive as-
pects in IT security. It focuses on the discussion and the ex-
change of opinions on recent advances and developments in
the area. The workshop addresses active players working on
reactive IT security in industry, government, and research.
In 2004 authors from twelve countries on three continents sub-
mitted 41 papers to the workshop. More than a hundred partic-
ipants from academia (54%), industry (36%) and government
(10%) from six countries attended DIMVA 2004. This issue con-
tains extended versions of the best and most interesting papers
of this year’s workshop. We selected papers covering different
topics of reactive security measures to illustrate the broad
range of activities in this field. In the sequel we give an overview
of the subjects discussed in the contributions.
In order to efficiently and adequately increase the security of
our systems by mounting preventive barriers and arranging for
reactive measures, we need to know what the actual threat is
that our systems are facing. Recently emerging endeavors look
into an experimental honeypot approach to assessing the cur-
rent threat. The honeypot or even honeynet approach is based
on the idea to place one or more different instances of elec-
tronic bait together with one or more sensors within the network
environment for which the attack potential should be deter-
mined. In this issue we present three contributions introducing
various aspects concerning honeynets and delivering insights
into the current threat our systems are facing when connected
to the Internet.
The contribution “Honeynet Operation within the German Re-
search Network – A Case Study” describes the requirements
for the operation of honeynets, an operational honeynet at the
Leibniz-Supercomputing Center within the German Research
Network (DFN) and presents the experiences made over a pe-
riod of two months. The contribution “Vulnerability Assessment
using Honepots” describes an operational honeynet within the
University of Aachen and basically corroborates the aforemen-
tioned experiences. More importantly, the paper elaborates on
the technical details of honeypots and brings up ethical, legal
and economical aspects related to this technology.
One might be tempted to object the significance of the pre-
sented threat assessments, which may be limited to the respec-
tive honeynet environments. The contribution “A Network of
IDS Sensors for Attack Statistics” may reconcile this argument.
The paper describes a network of internationally distributed
honeypots and presents an evaluation of the data delivered by
the honeypots. While confirming the previous results, the dis-
tributed approach particularly provides new insights into the
scanning range of the attackers.
After the threat we are facing is determined we need to assess
the vulnerabilities that the systems exhibit. While the threat
analysis helps us to adjust our security priorities, the vulnerabil-
ity assessment points us to the existing problems that we need
to solve in our systems according to our security priorities. The
contribution “Foundations for Intrusion Prevention” proposes an
Intrusion Prevention Infrastructure as a systematic approach to
efficiently close existing vulnerabilities by ranking them based
on the knowledge about the local system as well as about the
threat the system confronts.
Knowledge about the vulnerabilities of a system can also be ex-
ploited to improve the accuracy of intrusion detection results.
Intrusion detection systems generate a number of non-relevant
alerts which correspond to unsuccessful attack attempts and
therefore should be assigned a low priority or should be sup-
pressed. The contribution “Using Alert Verification to Identify
Successful Intrusion Attempts” discusses techniques to verify
the relevance of alerts. The authors present a tool that inte-
grates vulnerability assessment mechanisms into an intrusion
detection system to verify alerts regarding the vulnerability that
the associated attack aims to exploit.
One of the main approaches in intrusion detection is anomaly
detection that focuses on deviations from usual activity pat-
terns. Since classical anomaly detection systems require
knowledge about usual activity they need to be trained with
data representing usual and security-compliant behavior. Un-
fortunately it is difficult to produce clean, attack-free training
data. To overcome this issue methods for so-called unsuper-
vised anomaly detection have been recently proposed. These
approaches do not require training data that are free of attack
manifestations. The contribution “Intrusion detection in unla-
beled data with quarter-sphere Support Vector Machines” pro-
poses and evaluates a new method for unsupervised anomaly
detection.
One of the current software development trends is the construc-
tion of systems by assembling software components of possibly
competing software vendors. This trend generates new security
threats e.g. maliciously acting components. The contribution
“Trust-Based Monitoring of Component-Structured Software”
introduces an approach to address the threats that detects mis-
behaving components by comparing activities at the interfaces
of components against application-specific security policies.
Another future trend is the application of small, mobile and net-
worked devices. These new technologies such as mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANETs) raise new security challenges. MAN-
ETs rely on the cooperation of all participating nodes. The prob-
lem of uncooperative nodes trying to save their resources is ad-
dressed by the contribution “Sensors for Detection of Misbe-
having Nodes in MANETs”. They propose and evaluate an ap-
proach for detecting and excluding such nodes.
We hope that the contributions of this special issue will not only
give the reader a broad overview on the variety and complexity
of reactive countermeasures in the Internet, but will be also
helpful for future work.
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